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Academics, financial market participants, and policymakers have once again 
demonstrated an interest in capital controls.  In the present context, the discussion has largely 
focused on emerging markets’ measures to curb capital inflows and/or to skew their 
composition away form more volatile types of flows (including the carry trade and portfolio 
flows). Similar discussions (with far less approval from official circles) took place in the 
early 1990s, as many emerging markets faced a similar surge in capital inflows. 
Unfortunately, there is enormous confusion about what experience tells us about their 
effectiveness.   
The existing literature on capital controls has (at least) four serious issues that make it 
difficult to make meaningful comparisons across theoretical and empirical studies.  We dub 
these “the apples-to-oranges problems” and they include: (i) The lack of a unified theoretical 
framework (say, as in the currency crisis literature) to analyze the macroeconomic 
consequences of controls; (ii) significant heterogeneity across countries and time in the 
measures implemented (even when they were in principle trying to achieve the same end); 
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(iii)  multiple definitions of what constitutes a “success” (capital controls are a single policy 
                                                 
1 This note highlights some of the issues examined in Nicolas Magud, Carmen M. Reinhart, and Kenneth S. 
Rogoff, “Capital Controls: Myth and Reality—A Portfolio Balance Approach,” NBER Working Paper 16805, 
February 2011. 
2 The measures span Tobin-like transaction taxes, reserve requirements on external borrowing or nonresident 
accounts, curbs on foreign exchange transactions, or outright bans on banks acceptance of nonresident deposits. 2 
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instrument-but there  are many policy objectives)
3; and (iv) the empirical studies are 
markedly heterogeneous and are disproportionately “overweighted” by the two poster 
children—Chile and Malaysia.
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In our recent paper, we delved into the details of this apple-to-oranges problem with 
the aim of defining a minimum common ground.  We begin our analysis by explicitly 
documenting the kinds of measures that are construed as capital controls.  Along the way, we 
describe the more drastic differences across countries/episodes and between controls on 
inflows and outflows as well a more subtle differences in types of inflow or outflow controls. 
Given that success is measured differently across studies, we standardize (to some degree) 
the results across studies. Inasmuch as possible, we highlight episodes that are less well 
known than the heavily analyzed cases of Chile and Malaysia. 
Our results are based on a meta-analysis of 37 empirical studies.  Table 1 provides a 
summary of the geographical coverage and broad-brush characteristics of this literature. The 
main findings can be summarized as follows: 
Capital controls on inflows, (i) make monetary policy more independent, (ii) alter the 
composition of capital flows, and (iii) reduce real exchange rate pressures (although the 
evidence on the latter is more controversial).   
                                                 
3 “Success” is sometimes taken to mean that the measures were able to reduce the volume of inflows, affect 
their composition, dampen nominal (and/or  real) appreciation of on the exchange rate, curb credit growth, and 
achieve a greater degree of monetary policy independence despite a managed or fixed exchange rate. 
4 Some studies are narrative-style case studies, others adopt a before-and-after approach, some involve pooled 
cross-country exercises, etc. 3 
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Capital controls on inflows do not reduce the volume of net flows (and hence the current 
account balance).   
As to controls on outflows, there is Malaysia and there is everybody else.  In Malaysia, 
controls reduced outflows and may have given room for more independent monetary policy 
(the other poster child does not fare as well, in that our results are not as conclusive as for 
the Chilean controls on inflows).  Absent the Malaysian experience, there is little systematic 
evidence of “success” in imposing controls, however defined.  Perhaps this owes to a 
“selection bias” in that the outflow controls in these studies were uniformly introduced 
during unfolding financial crises. 
All of the above implies that whether imposing capital controls on inflows or 
outflows is effective depends critically on “initial conditions.” For example, in the case of 
Chile in the 1990s, capital controls were just one additional element within a broad set of 
economic reforms—perhaps trying to fine tune the effects of the economic policy and 
institutional reforms. Or in Malaysia, non-compliance with regulations could have been 
heavily penalized. In both cases, the effectiveness of capital controls should probably be 
evaluated “at the margin.” Furthermore, the “macroeconomic policy package” that 
accompanies the controls also matters.  For example, the effectiveness of a Tobin tax-like 
measures (such as those adopted by Brazil in the mid-1990s and more recently) to deter 
inflows depends importantly on the central bank’s sterilization policies.  While the 
transaction tax reduces the rate of return to foreign investors on the domestic bond (as 
intended), heavy sales of bonds by the central bank (to sterilize, or offset, the expansionary 
effects of foreign exchange purchases on the monetary aggregates) may drive short-term 
domestic interest rates sufficiently high that domestic bonds remain attractive to foreign 4 
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investors—despite the tax. Such a counterproductive policy “mix” has sometimes 
undermined the effectiveness of the controls. 
To deepen our understanding of our assessment of the empirical literature, we 
develop a,   portfolio balance approach in which foreign investors have to decide under 
uncertainty the share of their portfolio investment to allocate in short- vs. long-term flows.  
We find that conditional on the elasticity of short-term capital flows to total capital flows, the 
same capital controls could result in either an increased, unaltered, or decreased level of 
short-term flows as well as total capital flows.  Thus, it is not clear that capital controls in 
two countries —even if exactly equally implemented—will necessarily be equally effective 
(or effective at all!).  We also model the conditions under which price-capital-controls (taxes 
imposed on the rate of return of short-term capital flows) generate the same effect on capital 
inflows as quantity-capital-controls (restrictions to the quantity of capital flows permitted). 
Interestingly, we find that that the degree of equivalence depends on the level of short-term 
capital flows at the moment that the controls are put in place.  Thus, we obtain a model that 
shows that only under very specific conditions will capital controls be effective in achieving 
its goals, consistent with the documented evidence. 
How do our results square with current policy thinking on capital controls?  The consensus 
view, oft stated by IMF officials and policy economists, is that market friendly capital 
controls on short-term capital inflows could be effective, although over time that 
effectiveness may be eroded as markets find more and more creative ways to avoid the 
controls.  Even this cautious statement might exaggerate the effects of capital controls, 
because so much academic attention has been focused on cases where the initial conditions 
were favorable and because of excessive emphasis on just the Chilean and Malaysian 5 
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episodes.  Our results balance the discussion by broadening the set of capital controls 
episodes substantially, including for example less well known capital control episodes such 
as those in Czech Republic, Spain, Peru, Colombia, and others. 
Finally, we note that our analysis is narrowly focused on capital controls aimed at selectively 
influencing flows in and out of international markets.  In practice, many developing countries 
such as China and India, adopt a broad array of controls that drastically affect both domestic 
and international markets.  Reserve requirements are an important example of an instrument 
that is used heavily in many developing countries, and affects both internal and international 
financial integration.
5  We leave this critical topic to future research. 
                                                 
5 See Reinhart and Reinhart (1999). 6 
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Table 1.  Selected Features of the Empirical Studies 
 
Total number of studies 
 
37 
Studies not referring to Chile, inflows (1990) and 
Malaysia, outflows (1997) 
21 
Other episodes include:  Brazil, Colombia, Czech Republic, Malaysia (1989), 
Malaysia (1994), Thailand, Spain 
Type of Study  Percentage of studies 
Capital inflows (percentage)  59 
Capital outflows (percentage)  27 
Combination  14 
Description of measures  Country coverage 
Capital controls on inflows, 23 episodes  Indonesia (1990), Indonesia (2010), Malaysia (1989), 
Philippines (1992), Philippines (2009), Russia (2010), 
South Africa (2010), Thailand (1988), Thailand 
(2010), South Korea (2009), Turkey (2010), Argentina 
(2001), Brazil (1992), Brazil (1996), Brazil (2010), 
Chile (1990), Colombia (1991), Colombia (2002), 
Colombia (2007), Czech Republic (1992), Czech 
Republic (2008), Mexico (1990), Peru (2009) 
Capital controls on outflows, 5 episodes  Argentina (2001), Brazil (1999), Malaysia (1997), 
Spain (1992), Thailand (1997) 
   
Degree of “Technical Rigor”  Percentage of studies 
High  51 
Medium  16 
Low  33 
 
   
 